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Skirting the issue: finding queer and 
geopolitical belonging at the 
Eurovision Song Contest 
 
Jessica Carniel 
 
 
This article examines how the ideological boundaries of East and West are 
built, maintained and challenged through the performance of sexual and 
other politics in the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). It argues that the 
contest is a useful prism through which to examine and understand 
contemporary European debates about sexual politics, and the role that 
this plays in defining the borders of modern Europe and its conditions of 
belonging. The contest itself offers an important site for belonging to the 
European community both to states on the eastern margins and to queer 
communities throughout Europe. It examines examples of performances 
that have challenged sexual politics, such as the Finnish entry from 2013, 
as well as state responses to the queer dimensions of the contest, such as 
those from Russia and Azerbaijan. It concludes that different states may 
challenge the ESC rules on political gestures depending on their own 
status within the European community as well as the extent to which that 
gesture challenges or reaffirms “European” ideology. 
 
Keywords: sexual politics, human rights, Eurovision Song Contest 
 
 
Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that, despite its glittery, wind-machined appearance, 
the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) is a highly political event. Although the 
Eurovision Song Contest rulebook explicitly states that “No lyrics, speeches, 
gestures of a political or similar nature shall be permitted during the ESC”,1 
various political messages have been encoded into songs and performances over 
the years, and enacted through the fairly entrenched voting blocs, which are 
based upon historical relationships, geographical proximity, transnational 
connection and ethno-religious affinity. Indeed, Eurovision has as much been a 
site for acting out the contentious geopolitics of post-WWII and post-Soviet 
Europe as it has been commercially imagined by the European Broadcasting 
                                                          
 Jessica Carniel is a Lecturer in Humanities at the University of Southern Queensland, Australia, 
where she teaches on the history of Western ideas, ethics and human rights. Her broad research 
interests include Australian and global immigration, cosmopolitan cultures, sporting communities 
and identities, cultural studies and gender studies. She has published widely on gender and ethnic 
identities in literature and sports cultures in multicultural Australia. An avid Eurovision fan since childhood, thanks to Australia’s multicultural broadcaster SBS, she is interested in how the ESC 
has proliferated as a site for queer and cosmopolitan identities, and how Eurovision fans have 
emerged as a genuine and important fan subculture in Australia due to post-WWII immigration 
and the processes of cultural globalisation and telecommunications. 
1 European Broadcasting Union. 2014. Rules of the 59th Eurovision Song Contest. Eurovision,1.2.2. 
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Union (EBU) as the song that unites Europe. Yet it could be argued, as this 
article contends, that in recent years this geopolitical tension has been further 
charged by the politics of social justice. Russia’s controversial “anti-gay laws”, 
in which it is illegal to spread so-called “gay propaganda”, has caused the 
nation to be a site of global protest, especially as Russia hosted such high-
profile international events as the Winter Olympics in 2014 and the Eurovision 
Song Contest in 2009. Furthermore, the expansion of the event into the eastern 
margins of Europe, where legacies of Soviet ideologies intersect with 
contemporary Islam, has also fuelled tension over the role that liberal sexual 
politics play in defining modern Europe. Given the much-documented strong 
gay fan base for the Eurovision Song Contest, as well as its reputation for high 
camp, this article argues that the event has become an effective site for 
understanding contemporary European debates about gay rights and identity 
politics. This has been achieved in a manner that has somehow effectively 
skirted around the European Broadcasting Union’s ideas and rules about what 
constitutes political gestures and political causes. However, eluding these rules 
and regulations is dependent upon the status of the entrant’s state in “Europe” 
and the extent to which their political statement contributes or detracts from 
Europe’s defining and dominant ideologies. The article also explores how this 
movement is enacted in specific geopolitical dimensions that perhaps further 
exacerbates the political and socio-cultural divide between eastern and western 
Europe. 
 
 
Defining the borders of Europe through Eurovision 
The very origins of the Eurovision Song Contest belie its political significance. 
Modelled on the Italian San Remo Festival, the ESC was conceived with the 
intent of uniting the nations of post-war Europe; its more prosaic intention was 
to promote the European Broadcasting Union’s Eurovision distribution 
network.2 The first contest, held in Switzerland in 1956, comprised seven EBU 
nations: Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy 
and the Federal Republic of Germany. Although Denmark, Austria and the 
United Kingdom were also part of the network and did screen the contest, they 
did not register in time to participate.3 This post-WWII, Cold War historical 
context of Eurovision’s origins places the contest firmly within an implicit set of 
Western European values. The fact that the Soviet bloc established its own 
song contest in 1977, the Intervision Song Contest,4 only serves to reinforce the 
symbolic status of Eurovision as a Western European cultural (and implicitly 
political) event. 
 
The history of Eurovision and its participants nonetheless presents a 
significant challenge to binary understandings of the East and the West and to 
                                                          
2 O’Connor, Kennedy John. 2005. The Eurovision Song Contest: the Official History. Sydney: 
Carlton Books, 8. 
3 O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 8. 
4 Raykoff, Ivan and Robert Deam Tobin. 2007. Introduction, in A Song for Europe: Popular Music 
and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Raykoff, Ivan and Robert Deam Tobin. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, xvii. 
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the implicit values within this.5 The list of contestants and founding nations of 
the EBU paints a specific portrait of post-war “Europe” that is also firmly 
located within an historical alignment of Europe with the West, but as the 
contest has evolved and the list of EBU member nations has grown the implicit 
meanings of “Europe” and “Europeanness” in Eurovision have shifted 
significantly. Many newcomers to the Eurovision audience are often astounded 
to see entries from countries such as Israel and Azerbaijan, as these nations do 
not fit into their idea of what constitutes “Europe”. Even when the EBU 
eligibility is explained,6 this membership can still be understood as different or 
distinct to “actual” membership in Europe and its community, revealing 
particular cultural, linguistic and religious assumptions about what constitutes 
a European nation.7 EBU membership is seen as an economic or commercial 
relationship, which results from considering television as a business enterprise 
in addition to a cultural venture. Television and radio broadcasting, as well as 
the arts and popular culture more broadly, are important sites of cultural 
exchange that can foster a sense of shared identity, community and 
citizenship.8 Karen Fricker and Milija Gluhovic argue that the ESC specifically 
is an ongoing and historical “symbolic contact zone”9 for European countries 
that facilitates these processes of exchange and communal identity formation. 
 
The very concept of “Europe” itself has historically shifting borders that 
suggest an ongoing interplay between the persistent binary of its eastern and 
western reaches. As Etienne Balibar states, “Europe has never been a closed 
space since it emerged as a historical reality and will never become one”; its 
borders are “arbitrary”.10 Geographically, the European and Asian continents 
are conjoined, virtually indistinguishable, which Balibar has described as the 
“un-limited character of the European ‘continent’”.11 This is illustrated further 
in the post-Cold War era as “Europe” expands to incorporate Turkey and 
former Soviet states that are geographically proximate but are considered by 
some to be ideologically different on the basis of assumptions about historical 
and cultural specificity. Even the mythology of Europe suggests an ambiguous 
cultural origin and geographical identity. Anthony Pagden’s wry account of 
Europe’s Eastern origins perhaps illustrates this best: “an abducted Asian 
woman gave Europe her name; a vagrant Asian exile gave Europe its political 
and finally its cultural identity; and an Asian prophet gave Europe its 
                                                          
5 Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. 2013. Introduction: Eurovision and the “New” Europe, in 
Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, 
edited by Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 17. 
6 For an explanation of admission guidelines for the EBU, see European Broadcasting Union, 
Admission, 2015 (accessed: 8. April 2015). See also the explanation for Eurovision participation 
provided on the Eurovision website: Eurovision.tv Which Countries Can Take Part?, 2015. 
(accessed: 8. April 2015). 
7 See, for example, discussions of such perceptions in the popular press, many of which focus on the 
perennially popular question of why Israel is a Eurovision contestant: Denham, Jess. 2014. 
Eurovision 2014 Voting: Why is it So Political?. The Independent, 1. May 2014 (accessed: 15. April 
2015); Westbrook, Caroline. 2012. It’s the Eurovision Song Contest, not the European Song 
Contest. Metro, 24. May 2012 (accessed: 15. April 2015). 
8 Fricker and Gluhovic, Introduction, 2. 
9 Fricker and Gluhovic, Introduction, 3. 
10 Balibar, Etienne. 2009. Ideas of Europe: Civilization and Constitution. Iris 1(1), 3–17, 6–7. 
Original emphasis. 
11 Balibar, Ideas of Europe, 6. Original emphasis. 
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religion”.12 Furthermore, the processes of colonisation and immigration have 
led to the permeation of various European cultures across the world, which 
arguably further expands the reaches of “Europe”, its culture and its ideologies. 
This has in turn influenced the reach and appeal of the ESC. As Ivan Raykoff 
highlights, the Middle Eastern contingent of the ESC is a natural result of 
French colonialism and British presence in the region during the formative 
years of the EBU,13 while Eurovision’s Australian audience is the result of 
significant waves of post-war European migration and a government policy of 
multiculturalism that facilitated transnational cultural connection through the 
establishment of a dedicated multicultural broadcaster, SBS, which subscribes 
to EBU content. 
 
Despite the apparent arbitrariness of European borders observed by Balibar, 
and by extension the borders of the EBU, there is resistance against 
incorporating historical differences into its definition. The distinction between 
East and West lingers in the political and cultural imaginary, which is in turn 
reflected and challenged by the Eurovision Song Contest. Ivan Raykoff and 
Robert Deam Tobin argue that the contest provides literal and figurative access 
to an ideal of post-war, modern European society that is “democratic, capitalist, 
peace-loving, multicultural, sexually liberated and technologically advanced.”14 
This provides a significant challenge for the newer European states that are 
seeking belonging within the European community, or older states seeking to 
maintain their status in a changing social and political environment, while 
simultaneously developing and maintaining an individual national culture and 
identity that may at times be at odds with those modern European values 
outlined above by Raykoff and Tobin, particularly around issues of sexuality. 
Éric Fassin’s appropriation of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” 
thesis as a sexual clash of civilisations clearly indicates the importance of 
gender and sexual politics in understanding modern geopolitical affiliations, 
particularly within Europe.15 The idea that sexual politics are an important 
ideological boundary has also been taken up in Jasbir Puar’s concept of 
“homonationalism”, which addresses the normalisation of queer politics and 
identities into nationalist discourse and its utilisation in delineating the 
boundaries between the progressive West and the oppressive ‘other’.16 While 
this other is increasingly stereotyped as Islamic in post-9/11 discourses, Conor 
O’Dwyer’s examination of gay rights movements in Poland highlights how 
other historical and socio-political differences are also at play. Specifically, the 
tension between the liberal West and post-communist East can also result in a 
potential backlash against European Union (EU) expectations. O’Dwyer found 
this clash of norms to be productive in the Polish context, but warns that in 
                                                          
12 Pagden, Anthony. 2002. The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union. Washington 
DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 35. 
13 Raykoff, Ivan. 2007. Camping on the Borders of Europe, in A Song for Europe: Popular Music and 
Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Raykoff, Ivan and Robert Deam Tobin. Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1-12, 2. 
14 Raykoff and Tobin, Introduction, xviii. 
15 Fassin, Éric. 2010. National Identities and Transnational Intimacies: Sexual Democracy and the 
Politics of Immigration in Europe. Public Culture 22(3), 507–29, 509. 
16 Puar, Jasbir. 2013. Rethinking Homonationalism. International Journal of Middle East Studies 
45(2), 336–9. 
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other places could result in a threat to minority rights.17 The announced revival 
of the Intervision Song Contest in 2014 in partial response to the victory of 
Conchita Wurst underlines two key issues: there is an ongoing sense of 
ideological affinity amongst the former Soviet states, and sexual politics plays 
an important role in defining these boundaries.18 
 
Sexual politics has thus become a means of redefining ideological borders and 
is, quite literally for some political and economic organisations such as the EU 
and Council of Europe, a condition of belonging in “Europe”, as will be 
discussed later in relation to Azerbaijan. As such, attitudes to sexuality 
expressed and performed at Eurovision as a significant site of cultural 
exchange are charged with political value that can be the cause of tension or, 
more optimistically, harnessed positively. As Milija Gluhovic observes, “this 
European cultural performance can serve as a productive locus of tension over 
gender/sexuality versus cultural/religious identity in the service of a more 
progressive image of Europe.”19  
 
 
The soft and hard politics of the ESC 
Despite the contest’s rule against political statements and gestures, European 
politics have played an important part of the culture of the ESC. For example, 
amongst the more notorious characteristics of the ESC is the practice of 
collusive or bloc voting, in which certain culturally and politically aligned 
countries “swap” votes with one another.20 In some instances the underlying 
reason is regional, such as amongst the Scandinavian nations. In others, such 
as the Eastern bloc, regional affiliations may be further influenced by other 
historical connections, such as an ongoing sense of political or cultural affinity 
in the post-Soviet Eastern margins, while the German-Turkish bloc reflects the 
effects of migration flows on communities’ sense of cultural identity and 
loyalty.21 In rarer instances, arguably minimised by changes to voting rules 
and practices that allow for popular votes from audiences, countries may be 
either “punished” or “rewarded” with votes in relation to current political 
issues. Eurovision has also been the launching pad for the political careers of 
several contestants: Norway’s 1966 contestant, Åse Kleveland, later became 
the minister of culture; Ireland’s winner, Dana, became a member of the 
European Parliament in the late 1990s; and the 2004 winner Ruslana also 
                                                          
17 O’Dwyer, Conor. 2012. Does the EU Help or Hinder Gay-Rights Movements in Post-Communist 
Europe? The Case of Poland. East European Politics 28(4), 332–52, 333. 
18 Barlett Paul. 2014. Bearded Lady Spurs Russia to Revive Soviet-Era Song Contest. 
Eurasianet.org, 23. May 2014 (accessed: 15. April 2015).  
19 Gluhovic, Milija. 2013. Sing for Democracy: Human Rights and Sexuality Discourse in the 
Eurovision Song Contest, in Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in the 
Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 194–217, 195. 
20 Ginsburgh, Victor and Abdul G. Noury. 2008. “The Eurovision Song Contest: Is Voting Political 
or Cultural?”. European Journal of Political Economy 24(1), 41–52, 42. 
21 For research into the various voting blocs, see Christensen, Miyase and Christian Christensen. 
2008. The After-Life of Eurovision 2003: Turkish and European Social Imaginaries and Ephemeral 
Communicative Space. Popular Communication 6(3), 155–72; Dekker, Anthony. 2007. The Eurovision Song Contest as a “Friendship” Network. Connections 27(3), 53–8; Spierdijk, Laura and 
Michel Vellekoop. 2006. Geography, Culture, and Religion: Explaining the Bias in Eurovision Song 
Contest Voting. Twente: Department of Applied Mathematics, Faculty of EEMCS, University of 
Twente. Memorandum No. 1794. 
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secured a seat in the Ukrainian parliament after actively endorsing the Orange 
Revolution, and has been an activist on various human rights issues. 
 
Politics have also not been entirely absent from the songs themselves. Italy’s 
winning entry in 1990, “Insieme: 1992”, sung by Toto Cutugno, was one of 
several songs in the early 1990s that sought to invoke the changing face of 
Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the USSR.22 
While the politics of “Insieme: 1992” were probably soft enough to be palatable 
for audiences and passable to auditors, producers requested that Ukraine 
revise the overtly political lyrics of their 2005 entry, perhaps unsurprisingly as 
it was also the anthem of the Orange Revolution.23 Although not overtly 
political in its actual performance, Portugal’s entry in the 1974 competition 
was used as a secret signal to begin the coup known as the Carnation 
Revolution. In the same year, Gigliola Cinquetti’s “Sì” was subject to 
censorship in her home state of Italy as a referendum on a liberalised divorce 
law was due to be held, and it was feared that the song could be interpreted as 
a political statement in favour of the laws, thus influencing voters.24 Although 
applauded by the Israeli president for their contribution to the nation and to 
peace,25 Noa and Mira Awad’s 2009 Israeli entry, “There Must Be Another 
Way”, courted controversy due to Awad’s Arab ethnicity and the use of Arabic 
in the song. Also including lyrics in English and Hebrew, the song provides no 
direct political commentary but is thematically preoccupied with peace and 
respect for humanity. Iceland’s 2014 entry, Pollapönk’s “No Prejudice”, also 
sought to draw attention to respect and social justice and succeeded in a much 
less controversial manner. These examples illustrate how broad commentary 
on ideologies core to “European” human rights and social justice can slip past 
the ESC rules and regulations, while songs relating to specific political 
situations are subjected to greater scrutiny. 
 
 
The politics of kissing: performing gender politics on the Eurovision 
stage 
Eurovision’s gender politics have gained prominence since the 1990s and are 
arguably increasingly important as human rights issues pertaining to sexuality 
have increased in global importance, and the ESC’s queer audience have 
garnered more attention. Various scholars have observed that Dana 
International’s winning performance of “Diva” for Israel in 1998 symbolised 
Eurovision’s “coming out”. Prior to this, Eurovision’s gay appeal, while present, 
was considered closeted.26 Eurovision’s camp aesthetic, which remains a large 
                                                          
22 Raykoff, Camping on the Borders, 44. 
23 Heller, Dana. 2007. t.A.T.u. You! Russia, the Global Politics of Eurovision, and Lesbian Pop. 
Popular Music 26(2), 195–210, 203. 
24 Wolther, Irving. 2012. More Than Just Music: the Seven Dimensions of the Eurovision Song 
Contest. Popular Music 31(1), 165–71, 168. 
25 Webb, Glen. 2009. Israel: Noa & Mira to Moscow with Einaiych. Eurovision,tv, 2. March 2009 
(accessed: 15. April 2015). 
26 Cassiday A., Julie. 2014. Post-Soviet Pop Goes Gay: Russia’s Trajectory to Eurovision Victory. 
The Russian Review 73(1), 1–23, 8; Motschenbacher, Heiko. 2013. “Now Everybody Can Wear a Skirt”: Linguistic Constructions of Non-Heteronormativity at Eurovision Song Contest Press 
Conferences. Discourse and Society 24(5), 590–614, 593; Singleton, Brian / Karen Fricker and 
Elena Moreo. 2007. Performing the Queer Network: Fans and Families at the Eurovision Song 
Contest. SQS: Journal of Queer Studies in Finland 12–24, 12, 19 (accessed: 15. April 2015). 
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part of its appeal to its gay audience, has become increasingly overt in recent 
years. Ukraine’s Verka Serduchka is considered by many to be a pinnacle of 
Eurovision camp that at once plays with gender politics, by virtue of its drag 
queen artist, and the harder politics of Ukrainian tensions with Russia.27 Yet 
the camp aesthetic does not completely contain the appeal and importance of 
Eurovision for the gay and queer communities of Europe. As Peter Rehberg 
observes, Eurovision “certainly provides the opportunity for queer people to 
experience a feeling of belonging on both the national and transnational level, 
which is rendered more complicated or foreclosed in other cultural mainstream 
contexts and the public sphere in general.”28 In short, it is a site where the idea 
of “European citizen” is open to those otherwise marginalised. As equality on 
the grounds of sexual orientation increases in importance throughout Europe 
and the world, such politics begin to permeate the concerns of the songwriters 
and performers, just as they have been preoccupied with other political trends, 
such as, in the early 1990s,the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
 
Finland’s Krista Siegfrids’s performance of “Marry Me” in the 2013 ESC 
provides a significant text for examining the gender politics of Eurovision and 
its role in instigating debate about significant issues in queer human rights 
and social justice. In her live performance, Siegfrids is surrounded by female 
backup dancers dressed as male wedding attendants, who later reveal 
bridesmaid dresses under their suits. Two female backup singers dressed in 
highly stylised, 1940s-inspired outfits accompany her. This ostensible paean to 
the heterosexual institution of marriage is subverted by a kiss shared between 
Siegfrids and one of the backup singers. (Such public kisses between women 
are referred to popularly and in the media as “lesbian kisses”, regardless of the 
sexual orientation and identities of the women involved. Use of the term to 
refer to kisses between women seeks to draw upon this popular discourse, but 
is acknowledged to be misrepresentative and problematic.) The live 
performance contrasts against the official music video for the song, in which 
Siegfrids aggressively pursues her recalcitrant boyfriend with the assistance of 
her leather-clad female friends, one of whom Siegfrids slaps suggestively on the 
bottom as she passes her to enter the awaiting car. While certainly more 
heteronormative than the live performance, Siegfrids’s slap on her friend’s 
behind suggests the possibility of a more fluid sexuality, even as she pursues 
marriage to a man; conversely, the slap occurs in the presence of male 
onlookers, which could also suggest a performance of queer sexuality for a male 
gaze. While the live performance of “Marry Me” was derided by some as too 
kitsch, it was nevertheless a pointed statement regarding gay marriage rights 
throughout Europe. 
 
The kiss was a highly publicised dimension of Siegfrids’s performance. 
According to the rules of the ESC, the stage performance at the finals must be 
identical to the dress rehearsals. The kiss was thus a known element of the 
performance, featured in press coverage of the rehearsals, and one that had 
passed the scrutiny of the officials despite complaints from more conservative 
                                                          
27 Rehberg, Peter and Mikko Tuhkanen. 2007. Danzing Time: Dissociative Camp and European 
Synchrony. SQS: Journal of Queer Studies in Finland 12, 43–59 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 
28 Rehberg, Peter. 2013. Taken by a Stranger: How Queerness Haunts Germany at Eurovision, in 
Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, 
edited by Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 178–93, 178. 
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countries that the kiss broke the ESC rule regarding political statements. In 
response to these complaints, Siegfrids stated, “I don’t think ‘Marry Me’ is 
political. It’s about love and tolerance. But gay marriage is not allowed in 
Finland and that’s wrong. I wanted to make a statement about that.”29 The 
Turkish and Greek media disagreed that the kiss was not political, citing the 
rule about political gestures and bringing the contest into disrepute in their 
criticisms of her actions.30 Turkey cancelled its broadcast of the event, citing 
poor ratings, while gay activists outside of Turkey claimed it was due to the 
media furore over the kiss.31 
 
Siegfrids’s statement was in response to the failure of a Finnish marriage 
equality bill in 2012, which the Finnish parliament eventually passed in 
December 2014 by a narrow vote of 102 in favour and 92 against. The act 
removed the distinction between same-sex unions and heterosexual marriage, 
affording same-sex couples equal rights in adoption and shared surnames.32 
Prior to this change, Finland was the only country in the Nordic region to have 
maintained conservative marriage laws, although registered partnerships 
between same-sex couples had been permitted since 2002.33 While Scandinavia 
holds, in the global imaginary, a reputation for being more socially progressive 
than other parts of Europe, Finland’s stance on homosexuality had, until the 
passing of the 2014 bill, been slightly more conservative in comparison to its 
Nordic neighbours. This is due in part to conservative, often religious-based 
aspects of traditional Finnish culture and to Finland’s geopolitical status as a 
boundary between progressive Scandinavia (and by extension the West) and 
Soviet Russia. As Jens Rydstrom explains, Finland’s geography placed it in a 
precarious political position during the Cold War, with significant 
repercussions for its internal politics, including its approach to social issues, 
such as gay rights.34 Homosexuality was constructed as a foreign concept – 
specifically “something that was done in Sweden”35 – much in the same way 
that is has continued to be constructed as a foreign import in Russian discourse 
about homosexuality.36 
 
Siegfrids’s onstage kiss is evocative of fellow Eurovision contestants t.A.T.u, an 
established Russian pop act who gained global notoriety for their faux lesbian 
antics both on stage and in their music videos prior to their appearance as 
contestants in the 2003 ESC at Riga. Comprised of Lena Katina and Yulia 
Volkova, t.A.T.u emerged in the 1990s as a contrived girl band that 
deliberately played with faux lesbianism as a commercial ploy that was openly 
                                                          
29 Wyatt, Daisy. 2013. Eurovision 2013 to Feature First Lesbian Kiss in Protest Against Lack of 
Gay Marriage Legislation. The Independent, 17. May 2013 (accessed: 15. April 2015). 
30 Glennie, Alasdair and Laura Cox. 2013. Finnish Entrant Krista Siegfrids Stokes Controversy in 
Eurovision with On-Stage Kiss During ”Lesbian Wedding”. The Daily Mail, 18. May 2013 (accessed 
15. April 2015). 
31 Morgan, Joe and Dan Littauer. 2013. Turkey Cancels Eurovision Song Contest over Lesbian 
Kiss, GayStarNews, 16. May 2013. (accessed: 17. April 2015). 
32 Rosendahl, Jussi and Anna Ercanbrack. 2014. Finland Votes to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage. 
Reuters, 28. November 2014 (accessed: 17. April 2015). 
33 Jussi and Ercanbrack, Finland Votes to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage. 
34 Rydström, Jens. 2011. Odd Couples: a History of Gay Marriage in Scandinavia. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 63. 
35 Rydström, Odd Couples, 63. 
36 Baer, Brian James. 2011. Queer Russia: Othering the Other of the West, in Queer in Europe: 
Contemporary Case Studies, edited by Downing, Lisa and Robert Gillett. Farnham: Ashgate, 3. 
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acknowledged in Russia by both the performers and their management.37 In 
2003, they gained success beyond Russia with their single, “All The Things She 
Said” and its follow-up, “Not Gonna Get Us”. They were selected to represent 
Russia in the 2003 ESC in the hopes that an internationally-recognised act still 
experiencing global popularity would secure a Eurovision victory.38 While 
t.A.T.u were bookmakers’ favourites to win and did achieve third place, their 
unprofessional behaviour in the lead-up to the contest, such as arriving late to 
the required dress rehearsals in Riga and insolent attitudes in press 
conferences, marred their reputations with contest officials and voters prior to 
their lacklustre and off-key performance at the finals. Unlike Siegfrids at 
Malmo, t.A.T.u did not kiss during their 2003 ESC performance. Beyond some 
handholding and a moment where Katina and Volkova knelt down together at 
the back of the stage and gazed at one another, t.A.T.u’s notorious antics were 
almost entirely absent.  
 
Although the performers were full of bluster in the days leading up to the 
contest, they were ultimately compliant with its rules and expectations when it 
came to the performance itself. Nevertheless, t.A.T.u attributed their loss to 
homophobia rather than to a poor performance that could not be saved by votes 
from an existing fan base. Yet, this rationalisation was at odds with 
Eurovision’s famed queer fan base and its significance for these gay viewers, 
even though t.A.T.u had been subject to homophobic criticisms throughout 
their career.39 Furthermore, such claims are undermined by t.A.T.u’s use of 
lesbianism as a spectacle of (male) heterosexual fantasy rather than a political 
statement. While t.A.T.u were not entirely apolitical – they were notoriously 
outspoken on the US involvement in Iraq and frequently articulate a strong 
Russian nationalism – their gender politics are rendered suspect by their 
exploitation of the image of lesbian desire as commercial product. As Heller 
observes, t.A.T.u were designed to be both titillating and offensive to everyone, 
including feminists and gay activists.40 
 
While Siegfrids and t.A.T.u may hold acts of faux lesbianism in common, they 
differ significantly in terms of political intent. Even in performances where 
they did kiss and touch one another intimately, making statement on gender 
issues was never t.A.T.u’s intent, whereas it is central to Siegfrids’s 2013 
performance, even if she denies that the act or statement is “political” by her 
understanding. In their analysis of queer public kissing, Charles E. Morris and 
John M. Sloop insist that same-sex kissing should be seen as “at once cultural 
representation and a political imperative.”41 Where straight kissing reaffirms 
heteronormative values and behaviour, same-sex kissing performed in public 
spaces disrupts these norms and “constitutes a paramount political 
performance”.42 Morris and Sloop focus on male-on-male kissing in their 
research, arguing that women kissing is far more tolerable in mainstream 
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society; they do not suggest that it is normalised but that it has been 
appropriated into male heterosexual fantasy, thus does not have the same 
political impact as two men kissing. Such an argument may rest upon context 
and audience. While not all Eurovision viewers are gay men, their prevalence 
within the audience alters the reception of the performance, which by 
Siegfrids’s own admission is targeted at a social issue of direct relevance to 
them, albeit not necessarily for the purpose of gaining votes. Placed within the 
camp pantomime of a wedding, Siegfrids’s relatively chaste kiss does not aim at 
titillating the straight male gaze (nor even the queer female gaze); it is a 
political performance that seeks to disrupt the idea that the institution of 
marriage itself, and the desire to enter into it, is the sole domain of 
heterosexuality. 
 
Conversely, t.A.T.u objectify lesbian sexuality for the purpose of fulfilling 
heterosexual male fantasy, and in doing so reaffirm heteronormative values. 
Their faux lesbian performance was political only inasmuch that its 
contrivance strikes out at Western identity politics, as Heller argues, and 
illustrates how such a politics had not developed in Russia as it had in the 
West.43 As Brian James Baer observes, homosexuality in Russia is “inscribed 
with Western hegemonic claims”;44 within this particular discourse, to align 
with gay identities and activism, therefore, is to align with Western ideology 
and to abandon Russianness, although some activist movements in post-Soviet 
Russia do work to legitimate homosexuality within this idea of Russianness 
and vice versa.45 The politics of t.A.T.u’s Eurovision performance is thus 
couched in the more traditional terms of national identity and foreign relations 
than sexual politics. Their song selection and performance was emblematic of 
Russia’s relationship with the West. By singing in Russian and flouting the 
contest rules in the lead-up to the event, t.A.T.u (and Russia) alienated their 
non-Russian voting audiences and articulated an historical Russian defiance of 
and disdain for dominant Western culture and politics.46 Declaring themselves 
“Russian body and soul”, the open secret of the inauthenticity of t.A.T.u’s 
performance of lesbianism becomes a joke at the expense of pop music 
marketing as a product of the West itself, and a statement of “Russian 
immunity and superiority”.47 
 
Nevertheless, as Julie Cassiday has argued, t.A.T.u signify the beginning of 
Russia’s “gay trajectory” throughout the 2000s, culminating in Dima Bilan’s 
2008 homoeroticised performance of “Believe”, in which he was accompanied by 
a virtuoso violinist and a champion figure-skater, both of whom were male. 
Expanding upon Yana Meerzon and Dmitri Priven’s contention that Russia 
developed a deliberate strategy for winning Eurovision, Cassiday argues 
Russia “went gay” throughout the 2000s for the purpose of winning a contest 
renowned for its gay audience and camp aesthetic. While Meerzon and Priven 
provide a useful analysis of Russia’s shifting geopolitics and its strategic use of 
international events like the ESC to promote a specific image of a modern, 
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post-Soviet Russia, they fail to tease out concepts used in their analysis, such 
as “progressive” and “tolerant”, in light of Russia’s reputation for social and 
cultural oppression, particularly in relation to gender issues. Furthermore, 
they overlook the camp dimensions of Eurovision and its gay fan base, which 
responded to the “seductive spectacle of masculine virtuosity and vanity”48 in 
Bilan’s ESC performance. As a consequence, Meerzon and Priven’s analysis of 
recent entries such as Bilan and the Buranovo Grannies in 2012, as well as the 
earlier performance by t.A.T.u, is fairly conservative, failing to acknowledge 
how ideas of tradition, nostalgia and wholesomeness hark back to more 
conservative and heteronormative gender politics. Such dimensions are 
explored more successfully in Cassiday’s analysis of camp and queerness in 
Russia’s Eurovision acts from t.A.T.u to Bilan. She emphasises that the gay 
trajectory evident in the entries of the 2000s had little to do with the reality of 
Russian LGBT identities and politics, as the increasing queerness of Russia’s 
Eurovision entries is in stark contrast to the increase in state-sanctioned 
homophobia that occurred at the same time. Russia has abandoned or perhaps 
completely reversed its strategy of queer performance since Bilan’s 2008 
victory; performances since then, such as Bilan’s reprise of “Believe” at the 
2009 ESC opening ceremony in Moscow and the Buranovo Grannies of 2012, 
have exhibited “blatant heteronormativity”.49  
 
 
Eurovision and homonationalism: redefining ideological boundaries 
between the West and the rest 
Russia’s strategic deployment of the gay trajectory highlights the importance of 
sexual politics to not just to Eurovision victory but also to Western socio-
political identity. Jasbir Puar’s conceptual framework of homonationalism is 
useful for understanding how and why such a gay trajectory would be useful for 
securing a victory from Western European audiences. Short for 
“homonormative nationalism”,50 the concept denotes how acceptance or 
tolerance of previously marginalised sexualities has become a criterion for 
legitimating national sovereignty in both domestic and global discourses. Puar 
developed the term out of frustration with traditional constructions of the 
nation as heteronormative,51 which did not adequately reflect the complex 
interactions between queer politics, nationalism and global relations. She 
argues that homonationalism is “a facet of modernity and a historical shift 
marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by 
nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship 
between the state, capitalism, and sexuality.”52 It produces particular 
narratives of progress and modernity that can be used to delineate and 
evaluate political difference within and between nation-states based upon their 
attitudes to queer identities and the access queer subjects have to civil and 
human rights. In other words, homonationalism has become a way of 
distinguishing between the liberal, democratic West and the rest. 
Homonationalism’s more cynical corollary “pinkwashing” refers to the strategic 
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appeal to queer-friendliness through marketing strategies; applications of this 
term to the Israel–Palestine conflict demonstrate the political implications of 
this appeal and its connections to homonationalist discourse.53 While 
homonationalism is useful for explaining how discourses of human rights and 
tolerance are used to differentiate between the liberal, progressive West and 
the rest, pinkwashing is an apt descriptor for Russia’s strategic appeal to 
liberal sexual politics in its attempt to secure a Eurovision victory and begin to 
lay the groundwork for its series of high-profile international events, such as 
the Winter Olympics and the upcoming 2018 FIFA World Cup. Arguably, 
however, recent controversies regarding homosexuality and human rights in 
Russia, such as the furore surrounding the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014, 
suggest that Russia, having secured hosting rights for these events, currently 
has little need of the pinkwashing tactic but may return to it, depending on the 
international climate. 
 
Homonationalism can and should be seen as an extension of Orientalist 
discourses and conservative imperialist thought, particularly in the post-Cold 
War, post-9/11 climate of global Islamophobia. While there has been a shift in 
the focus of anxieties from Communism to religious and cultural difference, 
such anxieties nevertheless symbolise the West’s ongoing desire or need to 
define itself against an ideological other. The boundaries between the Western 
self and its shifting other, as well as the role of homonationalism within this, 
becomes particularly relevant as the EBU expands to include Muslim-majority 
nations, such as Turkey and Azerbaijan, alongside the growth of Muslim 
populations within other European states through the processes of immigration 
and settlement. Within some homonationalist discourses, pro-LGBT agendas 
have been co-opted into anti-Muslim sentiment in order to create a further 
ideological boundary between the West and the Islamic world; whereas in older 
colonialist/Orientalist discourses the practice of homosexuality was considered 
a mark of lack of civilisation in Middle Eastern nations, in the homonationalist 
reiteration of this tradition it is now oppression of these sexualities and rights 
that signify this lack.54 Homonationalism, as an extension or continuation of 
the Orientalist tradition that is concerned with issues of social justice, can also 
serve to highlight the imperialist dimensions to humanitarian and human 
rights discourses that serve to promote Western interests, including those 
pertaining to sexuality.55 
 
Examining the intersections and contradictions between local LGBT activism 
in Azerbaijan and the deployment of human rights and sexuality discourses by 
foreign activists during the 2012 ESC at Baku, Gluhovic explores how sexuality 
discourse is used to construct and emphasise an image of a progressive 
(western) Europe that is at odds with the Eastern “margins”, which are in turn 
constructed as less progressive and, in some cases, oppressive. Even within 
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these Eastern European states, gay-friendliness is used to delineate important 
regional differences and to signify increased allegiance with Europe and its 
values; although there were several dissenting voices within Western press, 
particularly from exiled Azeris, some activists in Azerbaijan sketched a picture 
of an Azeri society that was relatively tolerant to homosexuality in comparison 
with its neighbours such as Iran. Iran, in turn, characterises Azerbaijan’s still 
relatively conservative attitudes to homosexuality as permissive, and as a 
degradation of morality resulting from their increased Westernisation and 
desire to construct themselves as a European nation.56 In fact, Azerbaijan’s 
hosting of Eurovision caused significant strain on the relationship between the 
two countries; Iran withdrew its ambassador from Azerbaijan after clerics 
criticised the event and characterised it as a “gay parade”, leading to the 
misunderstanding that a specific pride parade would be held as part of the 
event.57 
 
Azerbaijan’s official position on homosexuality is a useful barometer of its 
shifting position within the international community, although its acceptance 
and tolerance at a grassroots or societal level is more complex than the laws 
might suggest. The nation’s original laws against homosexuality were residual 
of its Soviet membership rather than pre-Soviet Azeri legal tradition. In Soviet 
discourse, Muslim-majority states, such as Azerbaijan, were sites of “Eastern” 
(homo)sexual perversion due to their bathhouse cultures.58 The elimination of 
such practices with the expansion of Soviet ideology into these zones was part 
of Russia’s “civilising mission”,59 and reflects the same Orientalism that 
permeates current Western human rights discourse.60 Anti-sodomy laws were 
introduced in Azerbaijan in 1923, with similar laws passed in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan in 1926 and 1927 respectively as a result of Soviet expansion.61 
 
Just as anti-sodomy laws were a mark of Soviet membership, repeal of these 
laws was a condition of European membership, because the Council of Europe 
requires its member states to assure certain human rights and democratic 
standards. In order to join the Council in 2001, Azerbaijan reviewed its 
criminal code, which included the excision of the anti-sodomy article. It should 
be noted, however, that expansion of gay and lesbian rights into equal civil 
rights and anti-discrimination policy does not feature amongst Azerbaijan’s 
further commitments to the Council and its various human rights projects.62 
Reluctance to progress on these issues is perhaps a more accurate reflection of 
attitudes to homosexuality in Azerbaijan than the change to legislation 
suggests. In 2010, Azeri officials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe (PACE) boycotted debates about same-sex marriage and 
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discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.63 As the chair of the 
parliamentary committee on social policy stated on the matter, “Yes, we have 
declared integration with European structures as our priority, but we must 
also protect our national and cultural values.”64  
 
Azerbaijan was again in the PACE spotlight in May 2012 in the lead-up to the 
Baku ESC when the assembly adopted a resolution on Azerbaijan’s human 
rights situation in response to the furore surrounding the contest, including a 
condemnation of radical Islamist threats against the participants of the ESC 
and the LGBT community while “strongly support[ing] the secular identity of 
Azerbaijan and its free choice of foreign policy orientation”. The resolution also 
noted that the “violation of Azerbaijani citizens’ rights and freedoms goes 
against [the] goal” of using “the Eurovision Song Contest in Baku to promote 
Azerbaijan”.65 Thus, despite decriminalisation for the purpose of attaining 
membership in a European governing body, Azeri attitudes to homosexuality, 
as well as broader human rights breaches, highlight the tenuous nature of 
membership in this political community. Viewed through a homonationalist 
lens, it could be argued that states like Azerbaijan can adhere superficially to 
particular requirements in order to attain membership but will remain on the 
margins of that community until “European values” permeate beyond political 
and economic structures. Alternatively, Azerbaijan could use its pre-Soviet 
history of non-heteronormative practices, as discussed above, to redefine ideas 
about sexuality within an Azeri cultural context that affirms national identity 
while aligning with “European values”. 
 
The stance articulated by these politicians reflects the significant residual 
intolerance to homosexuality that remains in Azeri society. Several factors 
combined, specifically religion, international relations and history, can be used 
to understand these attitudes. Islam is the dominant religion in the otherwise 
secular state,66 but it is important not to fall into the trap of simply dismissing 
Islam as a monolithic entity with singular views and impacts. Religion is 
complicated by regional politics and history; in the case of Azerbaijan, the 
practice and influence of Islam is complicated by its relationships with Russia 
and Iran discussed above. It is important to emphasise that religious 
conservatism, while present in Azerbaijan, appears to be more frequently 
associated with anxiety about Iranian regional influence rather than an 
accurate reflection of Azeri religious views.67 Conversely, as previously 
discussed, Iran decries Azerbaijan’s permissiveness on this issue, evidenced by 
its decriminalisation and tolerance of the gay culture associated with 
Eurovision, as a negative sign of their Westernisation and abandonment of 
Islamic values. Such attitudes were exemplified by the diplomatic furore 
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caused by the Baku ESC.68 The legacy of the Soviet era must be acknowledged 
for playing a significant role in stigmatising homosexuality in the Caucasus, 
which is perhaps now strengthened by some anti-gay discourses in global 
circulation. As with other national contexts, the result of this combined history, 
religious presence and contemporary international relations is that, while 
homosexuality is legal in Azerbaijan, it does not follow that it is socially 
acceptable. As the Azeri author Alekper Aliyev explains, 
 
People here don't mind, as long as it's not in their family. There are several 
openly gay celebrities in Baku who have money and bodyguards, and they are 
safe. But nothing will change for the majority of gays, particularly in the 
provinces. This society will never accept them.69 
 
Such an observation not only demonstrates the power of socio-economic status 
in providing protection to marginalised groups but also the gulf between 
legislative and societal change and between decriminalisation and substantive 
protection of civil rights. While homosexuals in Azerbaijan have the same age 
of consent as heterosexuals, and can openly serve in the military, they are not 
protected by anti-discrimination laws, do not have access to marriage or civil 
unions, and do not have equal access to adoption and IVF.  
 
Azeri activists’ refuting of the presence or extent of oppression within their 
society can, like Russia’s gay trajectory, be seen as an act of pinkwashing, but 
one motivated more by self-preservation than strategic marketing ploys, as 
they seek to maintain what rights and tolerance they do have within that 
society. Gluhovic goes as far to suggest that international attention to queer 
human rights and civil rights issues can be counterproductive for local 
activism, with particular ramifications for individuals within those local 
movements.70 According to Gluhovic, many Azeri activists distanced 
themselves from the Sing for Democracy campaign, which sought to highlight 
human rights abuses in Azerbaijan throughout the ESC event.71 He suggests 
that this distancing may have been from fear and intimidation, particularly 
given the threats circulating the local LGBT community; to protest could 
jeopardise their already tenuous place within Azeri civil society. This 
demonstrates the complexities of how and why homonationalist discourses can 
be deployed differently within a particular national context and within 
international contexts. Local Azeri activism for civil and human rights is 
(arguably) acceptable within the bounds of nation itself and can be used to 
argue for a modern, European Azeri national identity, but to participate in an 
international movement to condemn abuse of those rights is, to some officials, 
to align with foreign political values and therefore against the nation and state. 
 
For nations relegated discursively to be on the “margins” of “Europe”, like 
Azerbaijan, participation in Eurovision, let alone winning and hosting the 
competition symbolises belonging within the European community and, as a 
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consequence, the West. It is also for many an important nation-building 
exercise. Conversely, Murad Ismayilov argues that, despite the various 
economic and political opportunities it offered, Eurovision actually interfered 
with Azerbaijan’s processes of nation-building and national identity formation, 
including its negotiation of a post-Soviet European identity within the West.72 
Specifically, he argues that the everyday encounter with the diverse, middle-
class Eurovision tourists necessitated a “re-appraisal of the many imaginaries 
[…] the compatibility of values, habits and traditions [… of the] national 
cultural Self and the European – Western – Other.”73 The implication is that 
this re-appraisal would result in an emphasis of differences between the 
national Self and the Western Other rather than an affirmation of Azerbaijan’s 
Europeanness. While the LGBT dimensions of this encounter are relegated to a 
footnote in Ismayilov’s discussion, he does suggest that Western visitors’ 
“particular understanding of gender” would be amongst the more trivial 
reactions.74 Nevertheless, many have observed that the international spotlight 
on human rights issues in Azerbaijan, and the related PACE resolution on the 
matter, exacerbated this difference in the political realm. It jarred Azerbaijan’s 
political belonging to the European community as much as Eurovision affirmed 
Azerbaijan’s pop-cultural belonging. Western and Eastern perspectives on the 
encounter are important to consider: for the West it highlighted the importance 
of human rights issues, including equal rights for LGBT citizens, in delineating 
its ideological borders and conditions of belonging; and for the East (as 
represented here by Azerbaijan) it highlighted the ongoing force of colonial and 
Orientalist discourses in Western European dealings with its Eastern fringe. 
 
 
Conclusion 
As this exploration of several of the Eurovision performances and events has 
demonstrated, some of the more interesting explorations are occurring at the 
boundaries of East and West in both the soft politics of the ESC and the harder 
politics of nation-states and the organisations and institutions to which they 
belong. Despite its official rules against political statements in performances, 
there is still space on its stage (and in its staging) for political expression, 
albeit conditionally. While direct commentary or incitement on political issues 
in specific national contexts is censored, such as the Ukrainian entry of 2005, 
there remains room within this rule for broader statements that help to 
establish the ideological boundaries of “Europe” as a whole, without drawing 
explicit attention to its specific internal divisions, as can be seen in the cases of 
Toto Cutugno in 1990 and Noa and Mira in 2009. Krista Siegfrids’s on-stage 
kiss, while intended as a statement on the specific situation of Finland, is thus 
acceptable as it reinforces a broad liberal sexual ideology that has increasingly 
become part of the definition of modern Europe. Russia’s announced revival of 
the Intervision Song Contest demonstrates the importance of sexual politics in 
defining the ideologies of contemporary “Europe” and the reluctance of the 
more conservative states to be complicit with this, and it will warrant further 
investigation as this competition develops alongside Eurovision. 
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Eurovision is, by its very nature of bringing together diverse nations and 
cultures in an event that celebrates “Europe”, political. The various social, 
political and cultural concerns of the European citizenry find a place on its 
stage, which is a platform for nation building in its various overt and covert 
ways, and for requesting and expressing belonging to the European 
community. As discussed above, the modern tradition of Eurovision offers 
queer audiences an important opportunity to experience belonging to Europe. 
Perhaps ironically, this is an experience of Eurovision shared by both gay 
communities in Western Europe and the Eastern countries in which dominant 
social discourses about homosexuality are oppressive. The soft and hard 
political dimensions of the event are experienced differently according to a 
nation’s security in its belonging to Europe. In the case of the international 
concerns about Azerbaijan as a host, it demonstrates the very hard political 
limitations the nation faced for thinking about its identity as a Muslim state 
and as member state of Europe. For Finland, on the other hand, its 
membership in the progressive West, and the Nordic region more specifically, 
affords performers like Siegfrids the luxury of depoliticising their actions; while 
decried on the margins, the EBU’s approval of the so-called “lesbian kiss” 
implicitly established that in some cases and for some countries it was 
acceptable to reflect current concerns on the ESC stage. Importantly, Siegfrids’ 
kiss was acceptable because it re-affirmed equality as an important part of 
“European” – and by extension EBU – ideology. Even as the Eurovision Song 
Contest seeks its song to unite Europe, it remains a prism through which the 
EBU’s and the community’s shifting boundaries and power relations can be 
examined. 
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